Esprit critique
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bias · Probabilities

Conjunction fallacy

Linda problem, Erreur de conjonction

Judging that a combination of two events is more probable than one of them alone, which is mathematically impossible.

Mechanism

We judge probability by resemblance to a stereotype (the representativeness heuristic). A more detailed scenario seems more plausible because it is more coherent, whereas each added detail lowers its probability: P(A and B) ≤ P(A).

In practice

Example

Linda is 31, has a philosophy degree and is committed to fighting discrimination. Most people judge “Linda is a bank teller and a feminist activist” more probable than “Linda is a bank teller”.

Famous case

Tversky and Kahneman (1983) gave two scenarios to forecasting experts. A “complete breakdown of diplomatic relations between the United States and the USSR in 1983” was judged less probable than a “Soviet invasion of Poland, followed by a complete breakdown of diplomatic relations between the United States and the USSR”.

Defending yourself

How to protect yourself

Remember that every condition added can only reduce the probability. Be wary of highly detailed scenarios: the more precise they are, the more convincing they feel.

Don’t confuse

Base rate neglect

Base rate neglect ignores how common a phenomenon is to begin with; the conjunction fallacy judges a detailed scenario more probable than the more general scenario that contains it.

Going further

Source

Tversky and Kahneman (1983). About 85% of participants ranked the conjunction as more probable than one of its terms.

Practise

In the app, each entry offers ways to practise recognising the concept. No sign-up: your progress stays on your device.

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